Iran And Nuclear Weapons Pdf

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This widespread concern stems in part from Iran's uncertain intentions and recent history. Will it remain a revolutionary power determined to subvert its Sunni Arab neighbors, destroy Israel, and spread theocratic government to other lands? Or would an Iran with nuclear weapons merely defend its territory from foreign aggression and live in peace with its neighbors?

Iran stopped implementing the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA , which allowed intrusive inspections of its facilities, last week. On 4 January , Iran resumed production of 20 percent enriched uranium at its fortified underground Fordo nuclear facility under the same act. Yet, Tehran continued full compliance with the JCPOA for a year in response to European promises that they will keep their part of the agreement. With Europe reneging on its promises, Iran, in May , began reducing its commitments under the deal gradually.

Iran and weapons of mass destruction

There have been several recent events, both domestic and international, that are likely to have an impact on the shape of a future nuclear program in Iran. The incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was officially declared the winner, but the opposition candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohsen Rezaee, and Mehdi Karroubi, at first refused to accept the results. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a veteran of the Islamic Revolution and head of the powerful Assembly of Experts, did not send his congratulations to Ahmadinejad.

Widespread demonstrations occurred in Iran after the election. The Iranian election has made the job ahead much harder, but the determination to find ways to build trust and to create a strong diplomatic process has never been greater.

Nuclear energy has two facets. When used for peaceful purposes, such as power generation, medical services, agriculture, and industry, it can contribute to improvements in quality of life. However, it can also be used for military or criminal purposes.

Thus, there are both great opportunities and great risks. Two of the greatest opportunities arise from the contributions nuclear power can make to energy security and environmental challenges. Energy Security. Nuclear energy can ease concerns about security of energy supply. As economies grow, energy demands also increase. In regions such as Asia and the Middle East, plans for and expressions of interest in nuclear energy have been increasing. The expectation that nuclear energy will fill the gap between energy demand and supply has become very high.

According to a study by the U. Environmental Challenges. Nuclear energy is also expected to contribute to global and national efforts to cope with global warming, as carbon dioxide emissions from nuclear are much smaller than those from fossil fuel sources.

Compared with major energy sources, including other non-fossil-fuel alternatives, nuclear power is one of the most effective energy sources to reduce CO2 emissions.

As made clear in assessments by the U. A decision on whether Iran will produce highly enriched uranium HEU has not yet been taken, and there is still no decision about forging ahead with a nuclear program. The missile program is on a different level compared to the nuclear program. The report concluded that there is at present no intermediate-range ballistic missile IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM threat from Iran, and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent.

Many international commentators believe that this inalienable right should not permit the acquisition of sensitive nuclear materials and technology without transparent and plausible plans for strictly peaceful programs. This is especially true in light of rising nuclear proliferation threats caused by the diversion of peaceful nuclear programs to military use, by withdrawal from international nonproliferation treaties and agreements, and by theft or illicit trade of nuclear materials by non-state actors.

Iranian leadership rejects double standards on nuclear violence. The U. But that argument has so far not been embraced by the U. Indeed, based on Islamic jurisprudence, the development and use of weapons with indiscriminate impact on the population and the environment are prohibited.

The leader of the Islamic Republic has issued a religious decree against weapons of mass destruction WMDS and specifically against the development, production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. Iran does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests in the immediate neighborhood. In fact, to augment Iranian influence in the region, it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors, an effort that will inevitably suffer from such perceptions.

Furthermore, with the current state of its technological development and military capability, Iran cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region.

Engaging in a spiraling arms race to establish and maintain nuclear deterrence would also be prohibitively expensive, draining the limited economic resources of the country. New multinational mechanisms to assure supplies of nuclear fuel, at market prices, to countries with peaceful nuclear energy programs should be given a key role in nuclear power development.

These mechanisms not only assure fuel supply, but also promote nonproliferation and the sharing of nuclear energy opportunities on a multilateral basis. It remains to be determined politically if this INC can include Iran or if it would be parallel to another international fuel cycle under strict IAEA surveillance.

The most difficult question is whether multinational enrichment facilities should be encouraged in potentially unstable areas in return for rolling back incipient nuclear weapons programs. In , using the model suggested by IAEA experts, Iran proposed to convert its enrichment facilities to regional or multinational schemes, which provide the greatest degree of transparency by allowing the concerned parties to participate in the ownership and operation of these facilities.

However, none of these proposals, which were presented by Iran from January to October , received any meaningful consideration, primarily due to the tendency of the United States to manufacture a nuclear crisis instead of searching for a solution. In , a study by John Thomson and Geoffrey Forden of MIT suggested that measures can be taken to prevent the expropriation of a multinational facility by the Iranian government, and that the likelihood of discovering any concealed enrichment facility in Iran would be enhanced by establishing a multinational facility.

A requirement for international staffing should be a part of the agreement in places like Iran, where regional security considerations are a factor.

Their analysis describes legal, organizational, and technological barriers to nuclear proliferation, as well as barriers to nationalization. Experts at MIT have proposed another approach that could resolve the impasse if tailored to meet the bottom lines of all sides.

The countries would manage the facility jointly under continuous and intensive international inspection. The black box arrangement is the same one planned to protect proprietary European centrifuge technology at a new nuclear plant in the United States.

Reliable assurance of fuel supply is key to effective multilateral mechanisms. Assurance of supply for non-nuclear-fuel-cycle states in other words, putting the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle in practice would be significant in shaping and embedding robust nonproliferation norms and habits in the international community. Associate Professor of Public Policy and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom Matthew Bunn has expressed his views on potential contributions of international staff or ownership of key facilities in Iran.

He suggests an international staff on duty around the clock, but one that would work with Iranians. He believes that having zero centrifuges in Iran would be the best outcome for U. In late , President Ahmadinejad said that in five years that is, by Iran would begin to produce nuclear fuel and sell it to Western countries at a 50 percent discount. The offer was made contingent on the West ceasing its programs to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

The productivity of one Iranian centrifuge is about three separative work units SWU ; the buildings at the Natanz factory can hold up to 54, centrifuges of Iranian production, wit14h a total capacity of about , to , SWU of uranium hexafluoride for the production of civilian nuclear fuel. At around the same time that Iran announced this initiative, Tehran was offered the opportunity to host a Urenco enrichment facility on its territory.

The facility would produce materials for an international fuel bank controlled by the IAEA. Moreover, their proposal did not exclude the option of using the Iranian P-1 centrifuge and replacing it in the future with new Urenco models TC or even the TC However, this initiative was not embraced by Urenco and was not pursued any further. After October , Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and EU3 Germany, France, and Britain agreed in November to a more detailed suspension agreement.

Iran resumed uranium conversion in August under the leadership of President Ahmadinejad, who had been elected two months earlier. In January , Iran announced that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. That resolution called on IAEA Director General ElBaradei to report within 90 days on whether Iran had complied with the Security Council requirements, adding that the council would respond to Iranian noncompliance with additional sanctions.

Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will not suspend its enrichment program. It is, however, unclear how the council could meet this condition. Still, the Iranians are likely to return to the negotiating table at some point; when they do so will depend on how soon the turmoil within the political establishment dies down. Crucially, though, these grievances are unlikely to sink the talks before they get started: the issues are too important.

Neither side, for that matter, has a better policy in mind. Political relations between Europe and Iran are strained because their interests often clash, they do not trust each other, and they run their domestic affairs very differently, as Richard Dalton, former British Ambassador to Tehran, has said. In , the United States changed its nonproliferation threshold from objecting to any nuclear facility in Iran to objecting to enrichment activities. Many commentators in Iran believe that a solution to the nuclear standoff will come from reestablishing relations between Washington and Tehran.

However, they leave two questions unanswered: first, will American power diminish before it can damage Iran? Second, will the end of American dominance coincide with the appearance of a new unipolar power or with the creation of a multipolar world system? If the latter, will Iran be prepared for a multipolar environment?

The venture would use Russian centrifuges, and Iranian scientists would not have access to them. Iran already has experience with delays in Russian nuclear supplies, and insisted on continuing its own centrifuge development, which the United States and some European countries reject. I offer these final recommendations, in international, domestic, diplomatic, multilateral mechanisms, and technical areas, to suggest ways forward as Iran seeks to strengthen and expand its nuclear file.

International Issues. An ambitious reinvigoration of the grand bargain that was struck 40 years ago in the NPT is needed to usher in a new era of cooperation on preventing proliferation. The renewed grand bargain will need to combine steps that can be taken immediately alongside a vision for the longer term. It will also need to draw in states that are not parties to the NPT. Rather than rushing toward confrontation, with all its risks, all sides must put historic antipathies aside and find face-saving solutions.

To give the Iranian advocates of compromise a chance to succeed, the United States and the other major powers need to put offers on the table that will show the people of Iran that nuclear restraint and compliance will put their nation on a path toward peace and prosperity.

Article VI of the NPT legally obligates the nuclear-weapons states-parties to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapons states must recommit to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and take firmer steps in that direction. Iran does support a path toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Any viable solution needs to meet the bottom lines of all sides. For Iran, this means reliable civilian nuclear energy, defense of its rights under the NPT, maintenance of its pride and technological development, and assurances against attack.

For the United States and Europe, the bottom lines are no nuclear weapons in Iran; a broad and verifiable gap between the nuclear activities that would continue in Iran and a nuclear weapons capability; and full Iranian cooperation with verification including resolving all questions about past nuclear activities. Such a pledge is key to changing Iranian perceptions that Iran should retain a nuclear weapons option. Iran has already offered to sign mutual non-aggression pacts with its neighbors.

Domestic Issues. Iranians have no desire for international isolation, and the government of Iran is part of, and must be responsive to, Iranian society. The general public does not consider the nuclear issue to be of vital importance.

Nuclear technology will do little for the average Iranian. Iran has a track record of rational action over the past 30 years in a turbulent region. In addition, the June election was not so much a barometer of support for or against President Ahmadinejad as it was a stage in the overhaul of the political system in its entirety.

The choice of Iranian representative in the next round of talks will be very important; many recommendations have surfaced for Iran to send Salehi instead of Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Supreme Council on National Security. There is a lively debate among Iranian intellectuals on these very questions. Emerging from the debate is the suggestion that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has survived 30 years without ties with a superpower and which has withstood various sanctions, would be more stable should it decide to pursue a rapprochement.

How quickly can Iran make a nuclear bomb?

What will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world? Horizontally, they have spread slowly across countries, and the pace is not likely to change much. Short-term candidates for the nuclear club are not very numerous. Counting India and Israel, membership grew to seven in the first 35 years of the nuclear age. A doubling of membership in this decade would be surprising.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Supreme Leader of Iran , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , along with other clerics, issued a public and categorical religious decree fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons , [6] [7] though it is approved by some relatively minor clerics. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated in January that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, but was not attempting to produce nuclear weapons. After the IAEA voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council, [26] [27] the Council demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities [28] [29] and imposed sanctions against Iran [30] [31] [32] [33] when Iran refused to do so. In September , the IAEA Board of Governors, in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, [42] recalled a previous Iranian "policy of concealment" regarding its enrichment program [43] and found that Iran had violated its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Iran's representative to the UN argued that the sanctions compelled Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

Iran and weapons of mass destruction

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However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald J. Trump withdrew the United States from it in In retaliation for the U. President Joe Biden has said the United States will return to the deal if Iran comes back into compliance, but analysts say that renewed diplomacy would have to overcome major political hurdles. Iran Nuclear Agreement. Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament.

There have been several recent events, both domestic and international, that are likely to have an impact on the shape of a future nuclear program in Iran. The incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was officially declared the winner, but the opposition candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohsen Rezaee, and Mehdi Karroubi, at first refused to accept the results. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a veteran of the Islamic Revolution and head of the powerful Assembly of Experts, did not send his congratulations to Ahmadinejad. Widespread demonstrations occurred in Iran after the election. The Iranian election has made the job ahead much harder, but the determination to find ways to build trust and to create a strong diplomatic process has never been greater. Nuclear energy has two facets.

What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?

1 Comments

  1. NapoleГіn J. 22.06.2021 at 12:01

    However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald J.