Love And Other Theories Pdf
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- DNF Review: Love and Other Theories by Alexis Bass
- Romance (love)
- Sternberg's Triangular Theory and the 7 Types of Love
- The HoTT Book
Romance or Romantic love is an emotional feeling of love for, or a strong attraction towards another person, and the courtship behaviors undertaken by an individual to express those overall feelings and resultant emotions. The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Family Studies states that "Romantic love, based on the model of mutual attraction and on a connection between two people that bonds them as a couple, creates the conditions for overturning the model of family and marriage that it engenders.
Love is essential to our well-being. Though most have experienced it in their lives, defining love is challenging. Few researchers have put forth a viable theory on the concept of love. This theory suggests that people can have varying degrees of intimacy, passion, and commitment at any one moment in time.
DNF Review: Love and Other Theories by Alexis Bass
This essay focuses on personal love, or the love of particular persons as such. Part of the philosophical task in understanding personal love is to distinguish the various kinds of personal love. For example, the way in which I love my wife is seemingly very different from the way I love my mother, my child, and my friend. This task has typically proceeded hand-in-hand with philosophical analyses of these kinds of personal love, analyses that in part respond to various puzzles about love.
Can love be justified? If so, how? What is the value of personal love? What impact does love have on the autonomy of both the lover and the beloved? In 2 the implication is typically that I find engaging in a certain activity or being a certain kind of person to be a part of my identity and so what makes my life worth living; I might just as well say that I value these.
By contrast, 3 and 4 seem to indicate a mode of concern that cannot be neatly assimilated to anything else. Thus, we might understand the sort of love at issue in 4 to be, roughly, a matter of caring about another person as the person she is, for her own sake. Accordingly, 3 may be understood as a kind of deficient mode of the sort of love we typically reserve for persons.
Philosophical accounts of love have focused primarily on the sort of personal love at issue in 4 ; such personal love will be the focus here. It will be useful to distinguish these three and say something about how contemporary discussions typically blur these distinctions sometimes intentionally so or use them for other purposes.
Rather than responding to antecedent value in its object, agape instead is supposed to create value in its object and therefore to initiate our fellowship with God pp. Consequently, Badhwar , p. This similarity between eros and philia has led Thomas to wonder whether the only difference between romantic love and friendship is the sexual involvement of the former—and whether that is adequate to account for the real differences we experience.
Maintaining the distinctions among eros , agape , and philia becomes even more difficult when faced with contemporary theories of love including romantic love and friendship.
For, as discussed below, some theories of romantic love understand it along the lines of the agape tradition as creating value in the beloved cf. Section 4. Instead, the focus here will be on these contemporary understandings of love, including romantic love, understood as an attitude we take towards other persons.
In providing an account of love, philosophical analyses must be careful to distinguish love from other positive attitudes we take towards persons, such as liking. Some analyses do this in part by providing thin conceptions of what liking amounts to. Thus, Singer and Brown understand liking to be a matter of desiring, an attitude that at best involves its object having only instrumental and not intrinsic value.
Yet this seems inadequate: surely there are attitudes towards persons intermediate between having a desire with a person as its object and loving the person. I can care about a person for her own sake and not merely instrumentally, and yet such caring does not on its own amount to non-deficiently loving her, for it seems I can care about my dog in exactly the same way, a kind of caring which is insufficiently personal for love.
Whether love involves some kind of identification, and if so exactly how to understand such identification, is a central bone of contention among the various analyses of love. Closely related to questions of evaluation are questions of justification: can we justify loving or continuing to love a particular person, and if so, how?
In what follows, theories of love are tentatively and hesitantly classified into four types: love as union, love as robust concern, love as valuing, and love as an emotion.
It should be clear, however, that particular theories classified under one type sometimes also include, without contradiction, ideas central to other types. The types identified here overlap to some extent, and in some cases classifying particular theories may involve excessive pigeonholing.
Such cases are noted below. Part of the classificatory problem is that many accounts of love are quasi-reductionistic, understanding love in terms of notions like affection, evaluation, attachment, etc. As a result, there is no clear and obvious way to classify particular theories, let alone identify what the relevant classes should be.
Variants of this view perhaps go back to Aristotle cf. Sherman and can also be found in Montaigne [E] and Hegel ; contemporary proponents include Solomon , , Scruton , Nozick , Fisher , and Delaney The idea is that the union is a union of concern, so that when I act out of that concern it is not for my sake alone or for your sake alone but for our sake. The result is that lovers come to share the interests, roles, virtues, and so on that constitute what formerly was two individual identities but now has become a shared identity, and they do so in part by each allowing the other to play an important role in defining his own identity.
The first is that union views do away with individual autonomy. Autonomy, it seems, involves a kind of independence on the part of the autonomous agent, such that she is in control over not only what she does but also who she is, as this is constituted by her interests, values, concerns, etc.
However, union views, by doing away with a clear distinction between your interests and mine, thereby undermine this sort of independence and so undermine the autonomy of the lovers. Moreover, Singer argues that a necessary part of having your beloved be the object of your love is respect for your beloved as the particular person she is, and this requires respecting her autonomy.
Union theorists have responded to this objection in several ways. Nozick seems to think of a loss of autonomy in love as a desirable feature of the sort of union lovers can achieve. Fisher , somewhat more reluctantly, claims that the loss of autonomy in love is an acceptable consequence of love. Yet without further argument these claims seem like mere bullet biting. Solomon , pp. The second criticism involves a substantive view concerning love.
Part of what it is to love someone, these opponents say, is to have concern for him for his sake. However, union views make such concern unintelligible and eliminate the possibility of both selfishness and self-sacrifice, for by doing away with the distinction between my interests and your interests they have in effect turned your interests into mine and vice versa Soble ; see also Blum , Some advocates of union views see this as a point in their favor: we need to explain how it is I can have concern for people other than myself, and the union view apparently does this by understanding your interests to be part of my own.
And Delaney, responding to an apparent tension between our desire to be loved unselfishly for fear of otherwise being exploited and our desire to be loved for reasons which presumably are attractive to our lover and hence have a kind of selfish basis , says , p. The objection, however, lies precisely in this attempt to explain my concern for my beloved egoistically. As Whiting , p. This can be true whether my concern with my beloved is merely instrumental to my good or whether it is partly constitutive of my good.
Indeed, part of the point of union accounts is to make sense of this social dimension: to make sense of a way in which we can sometimes identify ourselves with others not merely in becoming interdependent with them as Singer , p.
Along these lines, Friedman , taking her inspiration in part from Delaney , argues that we should understand the sort of union at issue in love to be a kind of federation of selves:. Nonetheless, this federation model is not without its problems—problems that affect other versions of the union view as well.
Relevant here is the literature on shared intention and plural subjects. Gilbert , , has argued that we should take quite seriously the existence of a plural subject as an entity over and above its constituent members. As this criticism of the union view indicates, many find caring about your beloved for her sake to be a part of what it is to love her. The robust concern view of love takes this to be the central and defining feature of love cf.
As Taylor puts it:. Frankfurt continues:. Of course, to understand love in terms of desires is not to leave other emotional responses out in the cold, for these emotions should be understood as consequences of desires. Thus, just as I can be emotionally crushed when one of my strong desires is disappointed, so too I can be emotionally crushed when things similarly go badly for my beloved. In this way Frankfurt tacitly, and White more explicitly, acknowledge the way in which my caring for my beloved for her sake results in my identity being transformed through her influence insofar as I become vulnerable to things that happen to her.
This, however, would be disrespectful and demeaning, not the sort of attitude that love is. What robust concern views seem to miss, Ebels-Duggan suggests, is the way love involves interacting agents, each with a capacity for autonomy the recognition and engagement with which is an essential part of love. Consequently, it might seem, robust concern views can counter this objection by offering an enriched conception of what it is to be a person and so of the well-being of persons.
Another source of worry is that the robust concern view offers too thin a conception of love. Thus Velleman argues that robust concern views, by understanding love merely as a matter of aiming at a particular end viz. However, he claims, love can have nothing to do with desires, offering as a counterexample the possibility of loving a troublemaking relation whom you do not want to be with, whose well being you do not want to promote, etc.
Moreover Badhwar argues, if love is essentially a desire, then it implies that we lack something; yet love does not imply this and, indeed, can be felt most strongly at times when we feel our lives most complete and lacking in nothing. This conclusion, however, seems too hasty, for such examples can be accommodated within the robust concern view.
Indeed, keeping the idea that you want to some degree to benefit him, an idea Velleman rejects, seems to be essential to understanding the conceptual tension between loving someone and not wanting to help him, a tension Velleman does not fully acknowledge. Similarly, continued love for someone who has died can be understood on the robust concern view as parasitic on the former love you had for him when he was still alive: your desires to benefit him get transformed, through your subsequent understanding of the impossibility of doing so, into wishes.
All of this seems fully compatible with the robust concern view. One might also question whether Velleman and Badhwar make proper use of their examples of loving your meddlesome relation or someone who has died. For although we can understand these as genuine cases of love, they are nonetheless deficient cases and ought therefore be understood as parasitic on the standard cases. Readily to accommodate such deficient cases of love into a philosophical analysis as being on a par with paradigm cases, and to do so without some special justification, is dubious.
A third kind of view of love understands love to be a distinctive mode of valuing a person. As the distinction between eros and agape in Section 1 indicates, there are at least two ways to construe this in terms of whether the lover values the beloved because she is valuable, or whether the beloved comes to be valuable to the lover as a result of her loving him.
The former view, which understands the lover as appraising the value of the beloved in loving him, is the topic of Section 4. Velleman , offers an appraisal view of love, understanding love to be fundamentally a matter of acknowledging and responding in a distinctive way to the value of the beloved.
For a very different appraisal view of love, see Kolodny Understanding this more fully requires understanding both the kind of value of the beloved to which one responds and the distinctive kind of response to such value that love is. Nonetheless, it should be clear that what makes an account be an appraisal view of love is not the mere fact that love is understood to involve appraisal; many other accounts do so, and it is typical of robust concern accounts, for example cf.
Rather, appraisal views are distinctive in understanding love to consist in that appraisal. In articulating the kind of value love involves, Velleman, following Kant, distinguishes dignity from price.
To have a price , as the economic metaphor suggests, is to have a value that can be compared to the value of other things with prices, such that it is intelligible to exchange without loss items of the same value. By contrast, to have dignity is to have a value such that comparisons of relative value become meaningless. Material goods are normally understood to have prices, but we persons have dignity: no substitution of one person for another can preserve exactly the same value, for something of incomparable worth would be lost and gained in such a substitution.
On this Kantian view, our dignity as persons consists in our rational nature: our capacity both to be actuated by reasons that we autonomously provide ourselves in setting our own ends and to respond appropriately to the intrinsic values we discover in the world. Consequently, one important way in which we exercise our rational natures is to respond with respect to the dignity of other persons a dignity that consists in part in their capacity for respect : respect just is the required minimal response to the dignity of persons.
Given this, Velleman claims that love is similarly a response to the dignity of persons, and as such it is the dignity of the object of our love that justifies that love. However, love and respect are different kinds of responses to the same value.
For love arrests not our self-love but rather. This means that the concern, attraction, sympathy, etc.
By giving as little as they expect to get in return, seventeen-year-old Aubrey Housing and her three best friends have made it to the second semester of their senior year heartbreak-free. Going into Love and Other Theories I knew it was going to be anti-relationship, and I was okay with that. The Girlfriend Stigma TGS : a scientific term describing the disgrace girls face from guys when the girls appear to want to hold the title of girlfriend. I finally stopped reading because I was sick of the parties and the drinking. I was sick of Aubrey. I was sick of how she never explicitly told Nathan she was anti-relationship. Why is it okay for girls to do it to guys?
This essay focuses on personal love, or the love of particular persons as such. Part of the philosophical task in understanding personal love is to distinguish the various kinds of personal love. For example, the way in which I love my wife is seemingly very different from the way I love my mother, my child, and my friend. This task has typically proceeded hand-in-hand with philosophical analyses of these kinds of personal love, analyses that in part respond to various puzzles about love. Can love be justified? If so, how?
Sternberg's Triangular Theory and the 7 Types of Love
Robert J Sternberg's Triangular Theory of Love says that there are 7 different types of love so which one suits your relationship? We found Love is scripted, with predictable acts, scenes, and lines. Love is a journey. Love is a series of battles in a devastating but continuing war. Love is a relationship between a student and a teacher.
Homotopy type theory is a new branch of mathematics that combines aspects of several different fields in a surprising way. It is based on a recently discovered connection between homotopy theory and type theory. The present book is intended as a first systematic exposition of the basics of univalent foundations, and a collection of examples of this new style of reasoning — but without requiring the reader to know or learn any formal logic, or to use any computer proof assistant. We have released the book under a permissive Creative Commons licence which allows everyone to participate and improve it.
By Dr. Saul McLeod , updated December 29,
The HoTT Book
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Сердце Беккера подпрыгнуло. - Очень хорошенькие? - повторил он с нарочитым немецким акцентом. - Рыженькие. - Да, а как зовут вашего брата. Я скажу вам, кто его сегодня сопровождает, и мы сможем прислать ее к вам завтра. - Клаус Шмидт, - выпалил Беккер имя из старого учебника немецкого. Долгая пауза.
The expanded hierarchy of needs
Хотя большинство отделов АНБ работали в полном составе семь дней в неделю, по субботам в шифровалке было тихо. По своей природе математики-криптографы - неисправимые трудоголики, поэтому существовало неписаное правило, что по субботам они отдыхают, если только не случается нечто непредвиденное. Взломщики шифров были самым ценным достоянием АНБ, и никто не хотел, чтобы они сгорали на работе. Сьюзан посмотрела на корпус ТРАНСТЕКСТА, видневшийся справа. Шум генераторов, расположенных восемью этажами ниже, звучал сегодня в ее ушах необычайно зловеще. Сьюзан не любила бывать в шифровалке в неурочные часы, поскольку в таких случаях неизменно чувствовала себя запертой в клетке с гигантским зверем из научно-фантастического романа.
Поразительно, - пробурчал он, - что сотрудникам лаборатории систем безопасности ничего об этом не известно. ГЛАВА 47 - Шифр ценой в миллиард долларов? - усмехнулась Мидж, столкнувшись с Бринкерхоффом в коридоре. - Ничего. - Клянусь, - сказал. Она смотрела на него с недоумением.